



Redefining Legal Rights and Personhood for Animals: A Shift Towards Interspecies Justice and Sustainability

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the evolving legal and ethical debate on granting legal rights and personhood to animals within contemporary jurisprudence. It argues that the traditional classification of animals as property is increasingly incompatible with scientific evidence of animal sentience and with modern theories of justice. Drawing on ethical frameworks such as utilitarianism and deontology, the study analyzes how recognition of animals as rights-bearing beings can challenge anthropocentric legal systems and promote a more inclusive conception of justice. The article further reviews significant constitutional developments and landmark judicial decisions, including the Kaavan case in Pakistan and the Sandra and Cecilia cases in Argentina, to demonstrate the growing international shift toward acknowledging animals as subjects of legal concern rather than mere objects of human use. It highlights the implications of animal personhood for welfare, conservation, biodiversity, and sustainability, while also addressing major objections based on legal capacity, economic disruption, and practical enforcement. The study concludes that recognizing legal rights and limited personhood for animals represents an important step toward interspecies justice, humane governance, and sustainable coexistence.

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1. Introduction

The animal rights and animal personhood discussion is a paradigm shift in legal and moral reasoning that has long been anthropocentric, viewing animals as property. In the past, animals were only valued in terms of utility to people, which gave them the right to be used in farming, entertainment, and to perform research (Garner, 2013). However, in the past few years, increasing awareness of the sentience of animals, their capacity to feel pain, enjoyment and emotion has led to a reassessment of this point of view (Regan, 1983a). Animal rights and legal personhood movement is aimed at creating a more inclusive legal and moral system in which animal beings are recognized as legal and moral subjects and are granted rights and protections. Such rights are not theoretical but enforceable rights, which are necessary to make individuals and institutions act in a manner that helps protect the welfare of animals, not just to ensure that an animal is not abused but to involve a broader range of claims, including the right to a natural habitat or the right not to be kept captive. The global change has been marked by legal achievements such as the Islamabad High Court acknowledging Kaavan the elephant as a sentient being (Islamabad High Court, 2020) as well as a landmark case of Sandra the orangutan as a non-human person in Argentina. These legal cases demonstrate the increasing awareness

of the inherent value of animals due to the development of animal cognition studies and ethics based on the reduction of suffering (Karmer, Simmonde, & Steriner, 1998).

The animal personhood concept is a direct challenge to the traditional legal division between persons and property, which suggests that animal beings should be regarded as subjects of the law rather than objects. This movement has been influenced by such philosophers as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, who have developed their own approaches, namely a utilitarian emphasis on sentience (Singer, 1975) and a deontological perspective on animals as subjects-of-a-life (Regan, 1983a)." Their theories and scientific discoveries on animal cognition give a great basis of acknowledging animals as legal persons. Nonetheless, the way towards the legal status of animals as persons is also characterized by difficulties. It has been challenged by critics that animals are incapable of personhood since they do not have legal liabilities or responsibilities. There are also practical challenges in the legal systems, including how animals will be represented in a courtroom and how human and animal interests can be balanced. The opposition of economy and society especially the industries that are based on the exploitation of animals is a major challenge. Moreover, the issue of the slippery slope, in which rights could be granted to other non-human beings, makes the discussion difficult. However, the worldwide animal rights movement points to an increasing moral necessity to re-evaluate the human place in the larger ecosystem. The amendments of constitutions of such countries as Germany, Brazil, and India (Eisen, 2018) and other attempts to protect animal welfare, including the proposed Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare, prove the growing agreement on the necessity of systematic protection of animal welfare (World Animal, 2018). The judiciary has contributed to this moral change by ensuring that the theory is translated into practice through notable judicial decisions in various jurisdictions. Finally, by acknowledging the rights and personhood of animals, the anthropocentric norms are challenged, and the legal structure that would promote human and animal equality and fairness, as well as the creation of a more humane, fair, and sustainable global culture, would be promoted (Farm Animal Welfare, 1979; "Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre v. State of Chhattisgarh," 2015).

1.1. Definition of Legal Rights and Personhood of Animals

The legal rights are created by the legal system and are privileges or rights provided by the laws to people or entities and can be enforced either by the means of judicial or administrative procedures. Historically, such rights were only restricted to human beings, which shows an anthropocentric bias. Nonetheless, the concept of animal rights is a critique of this anthropocentric framework that animals deserve legal rights and respect as sentient beings because they also experience pain, pleasure, and emotions (Peters, 2016). Animal rights are not just theoretical but enforceable and bind individuals and institutions to act, or not to act to protect animal rights. These rights may extend to the forbidding of cruelty and exploitation, to the broader assertions of five freedoms freedom from hunger and thirst, discomfort, pain, injury or disease, a chance to express normal behaviour, freedom of fear and distress (Farm Animal Welfare, 1979). For instance, the granting by the Islamabad High Court of Kaavan, an elephant, as a sentient being deserving of basic rights, highlights the growing worldwide recognition of animals as rights-bearing entities. The idea of animal personhood also adds to the analysis of legal rights because it challenges the classical legal division between persons and property. Legal personhood refers to the ability to possess rights and responsibilities in the law. Though historically applied to humans and certain non-human entities, including corporations, the idea of personhood of animals undermines the traditional perception of animals as chattels or property. The legal consequences of such a redefinition are far-reaching because the interests of humans are not more human-centred anymore but rather the innate value of animals. This new paradigm can be seen in case laws, including the Argentinian court decision to declare Sandra, a non-human orangutan, a non-human person or the rulings by the Indian courts to give rivers and animals some form of legal personhood. The philosophical foundations of this movement are preconditioned by such theories as utilitarianism, which considers rights in terms of possibility to feel pleasure and pain, and deontology, which focuses on the duties before sentient beings (Broom, 2007). In addition, the progress of the animal cognition study that proves the emotional and intellectual skills of most species supports the fact that animals should be seen as subjects, not objects of the law. The introduction of the notions of animal rights and personhood is a paradigm shift in both law and ethics, as legal systems around the world start to contend with these concepts, creating the path to a more inclusive legal and moral domain (Jones, 2015).

The Concepts such as legal standing and guardianship would be the focus of animal rights discussion and legal representatives or guardians would act on behalf of the interests of animals, just as guardianship is used concerning minors or persons who are unable to make legal decisions themselves. But the rights afforded to animals are not controversial. Critics suggest that animals that do not possess the capability to comprehend or to perform legal obligations should not be accorded rights. This sentiment is summed up in the legal maxim *Ubiqui jus ibi remedium* -where there is right, there must be remedium - becoming a matter of concern on the practicality of availing legal remedies to animals who are not able to voice their grievances or even enter into legal proceedings (Waldau, 2011). Furthermore, it is a complicated matter to decide what animals should be accorded rights or personhood, as not all animals possess equal mental and emotional abilities. This inconsistency makes it difficult to establish a consistent standard of extending legal rights to animals, creating the possibility of inconsistency and difficulty in ensuring fairness in the exercise of the rights. Therefore, the animal rights or personhood movement can be considered a dynamic and changing field of legal and ethical ideas that challenges the limits of the conventional legal and legal frameworks and forces a re-assessment of the human obligation toward other sentient beings. This discourse is destined to transform legal systems and policies as it goes on to represent a more complex awareness of animals as entities worthy of moral and legal rights.

1.2. Nature, Extent, and Scope of Legal Rights and Personhood of Animals

Animal rights refer to the moral and legal rights of non-human animals founded on their natural value, sentience, and ability to suffer or enjoy wellbeing (Sunstein, 2004). These rights are based on the idea that animals are not resources or commodities to be used by human beings but are individual beings who deserve respect and protection. Such philosophers as Peter Singer and Tom Regan have played a major role in forming the modern animal rights debate (Sunstein, 2004). Singer highlights utilitarian ethics proposing that animals must be subject to the moral realm since they are capable of suffering and that their suffering should be equalized to human suffering. Regan, however, claims natural rights and states that animals have an intrinsic value of being the subjects-of-a-life. This standpoint considers animals as something more than passive objects of ethical interest; instead, animals are creatures with interests, liking, and experiential life which deserves being protected by morality. The animal rights concept confronts anthropocentric perspectives, which accept human interests and requires a paradigm shift in thinking, towards an appreciation of animals as moral agents (Waldau, 2011). Although the extent of these rights is a highly contested issue, with some considering the right to live without cruelty to the right to life, animal rights activists maintain that animals should not be subjected to needless suffering, exploitation, and death. Laws that are based on these notions have been growing, including anti-cruelty laws and prohibitions on certain types of animal exploitation, which are evidence of a wider societal acknowledgment of the moral responsibilities of human beings towards non-human animals.

The animal rights nature is based on the concept that animals are sentient entities who can feel pain, pleasure, fear, and well-being and requires moral and legal safeguards like humans do (Regan, 1983a). In contrast to human rights that tend to be based on autonomy, rationality, or even social contracts, animal rights emerge out of the ability to sense and the lack of suffering. This character is based on ethical theories that oppose speciesism: a bias privileging of humans over animals only due to their membership in a species. Animal rights are informed by both ethical theories of deontology and utilitarianism. Deontology implies that animals possess intrinsic value and humans must honor their lives and interests, whereas utilitarianism implies that the suffering of animals must be reduced because their pain is morally significant. Animal rights confront conventional practices and customs, including eating, testing, and entertainment using animals, which requires a re-evaluation of human culture and business. Although these rights are commonly regarded as moral imperatives, they are increasingly being acknowledged in legal systems although to differing extents. These rights bring out the notion that ethical consistency requires that we put our moral consideration beyond the human species and that we have a world where animals are no longer viewed as objects to an end but as beings with an intrinsic value worthy of respect and protection (Regan, 1983b).

Animal rights are a developing phenomenon that demonstrates the conflict between moral principles and reality. It has a wide range of entitlements, including fundamental rights against malice, and more radical rights, such as the right to liberty or the right to life itself. On the simplest and least controversial definition, the scope of animal rights extends to the freedom of

unnecessary pain, suffering, and exploitation which are already present in numerous animal welfare statutes. On a broader level, other proponents demand rights similar to human rights, like the right to bodily integrity, autonomy, and even legal personhood, as evidenced in the discussion of highly intelligent species such as great apes, dolphins and elephants (Karmer, Simmonde, & Steriner, 1998). The scope of animal rights can also pose practical concerns as to how far or how far society ought to indulge these rights e.g. by adopting a vegetarian diet, by eliminating animal experimentation or by closing zoos or circuses. Often, critics notice the problem of defining and implementing these rights in the world of humans, where animals are entrenched in the economics. However, such movements as veganism or wildlife conservation are manifestations of the extension of the practicality of these rights (Karmer, Simmonde, & Steriner, 1998). The scope of animal rights finally demands a restructuring of human-animal relations, a balance of human needs and appreciation of animals as moral and legally deserving beings (Wise, 2000). The greater our knowledge about animal cognition, emotion and social organization, the more ethical pressure there is to broaden the frontiers of animal rights and to see the possibility of a future where human advancement is not made at the cost of non-human life.

2. The Juxtaposition of Animal Rights and Human Rights

The comparison of animal rights with human rights challenges the traditional moral and legal systems which presupposes the anthropocentrism of an idea that only humans have the right to be treated as intrinsically valuable. Human rights are rooted in human dignity, autonomy, and rationality as stipulated in such documents as Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Traditionally animals were considered as property that did not have a moral standing. Yet, there are other philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, who claim that animals, as the sentient beings, should be considered in a moral matter since they can suffer. Singer utilitarianism demands the reduction of suffering by all sentient beings, whereas deontological opinion by Regan states that animals have an inherent value that is not based on the usefulness of human beings ("Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery," 2017). Animal rights are increasingly being legally recognized in cases such as Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery ("Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery," 2017) and the case of Kaavan in Pakistan ("Constitution of Pakistan, art. 9,"). Article 9 of the Constitution that safeguards the right to life saw the Islamabad High Court determine that Kaavan, an elephant, was entitled to species-appropriate treatment. The court said that human rights cannot be achieved without the acknowledgement of the animal rights and that human and animal welfare are connected (Bentham, 2007). This perspective criticizes the property-based nature of animals and contends in favour of their being rights-bearing beings. However, there is concern about the extension of animal rights. Critics such as Carl Cohen believe that by equating animal rights with human rights, human uniqueness is threatened. There are practical conflicts, especially in the field of agriculture and research, when human economic interests and animal welfare come into conflict. The shift toward the consideration of the interests of the animals is observed in such laws as the Animal Welfare Act 2006 of the UK and the Lisbon Treaty that acknowledges the sentience of animals. To incorporate animal rights into legislation, it is necessary to strike a balance between human dignity and the intrinsic worth of animals and this is an indicator of a wider ethical change to a more inclusive and non-speciesist conception of rights (Posner).

2.1. Key Arguments Against and in favour of Animal Rights and Personhood

The animal rights and personhood debate is philosophical, ethical, and legal, and critics of providing rights to animals argue that there is a cognitive difference between humans and animals. The critics claim that animals have no abstract thinking or moral reasoning because they do not understand the legal responsibilities, and they do not have human-like rights. Legal theorists such as Richard Posner argue that only the beings that can give back the rights they have should be provided with them, and animals are unable to do this (Cohen & Regan, 2001). Carl Cohen observes that animal personhood might create judicial anarchy, making it difficult to resolve human and animal interests. This may interfere with activities such as farming, hunting, biomedical studies that are essential in the wellbeing of human beings (Cohen & Regan, 2001). Critics like Friedrich Hayek focus on the economic impact of radical change because radical change may have a detrimental impact on industries that depend on animals, leading to inefficiencies in the market and losses. The slippery slope argument threatens to avail animal rights to force an examination on the rights of non-humans that could further diminish the meaning of rights.

Legally, personhood has long been used with reference to creatures who are able to enter into contracts in society and take responsibility, which animals cannot do. Human exceptionalism theories hold that humans have special moral abilities, which justify their prioritization of human welfare above animal interests (Shastri, 2012). Moreover, critics indicate that animal rights extensions would interfere with natural ecosystems, since predation and food chains are important, and humans are by nature omnivores. Issues like the question of liability when a personalized animal causes injury would also make legal frameworks even more difficult. The allocation of resources is another issue raised by critics who believe that taking resources to animal rights may compromise needs of human beings such as poverty reduction, health, and education (Javed, 2015). Nonetheless, the counterarguments focus on reevaluating the moral status of animals. It has been found that other species such as elephants and cetaceans exhibit emotional and cognitive complexities that should be protected. The Interspecies justice proclaims a fair treatment even outside of human relations, and animals are not to be exploited. Biocentric views emphasize the value all the life presents in itself and animal welfare is encouraged on the basis of the intrinsic worth and not human utility. Precautionary principle implies giving animals their rights until it is proven that they do not feel suffering (Kostka, 2016). An amended social contract would have animal protections, which would redefine the relationship between animals and humans. This discussion leads to a conclusion that is ultimately a challenge to traditional beliefs whereby they propose a moral and legal system that acknowledges the rights and inherent dignity of non-human animals.

2.2. Animals Rights Recognized in the Constitutions of the World

The position of animals in the constitutions of nations is very diverse, and there are many cultural, legal, and ethical approaches to the animal rights protection. In other states, there is a direct recognition in the constitution of animals as sentient beings who deserve protection and welfare (Bhagwati, 2015). For example, the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of Germany was amended in 2002 to encompass animals within the understanding of human dignity because it was acknowledged that the animal is not only a sentient being, but its welfare must also be considered and guarded by law. It is a landmark ruling representative of an overall European trend, with animal welfare becoming part of national legal systems, and in many cases, shaping EU laws. Similarly, the Constitution of India in the Article 51A(g) urges citizens to show compassion to living beings and the state is obliged to safeguard and promote the welfare of the natural environment, which encompasses animal welfare. The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act is yet another piece of evidence of an ingrained constitutional animal protection ambition in India. In the meantime, another illustration of constitutional recognition is New Zealand where the Animal Welfare Act of 1999 offers substantial legal protection to animal welfare.

Nevertheless, animal rights are not explicitly instituted in the constitution of New Zealand but rather with the changing perception of the people has developed over time to embrace the intrinsic value of animals ("Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007," 2007). Conversely, in 2019, Brazil included a provision in its constitution assuming animals as sentient beings, thus making it clear that legislations are essential to safeguard their welfare and this has been a strong shift towards formal animal rights acknowledgment on a constitutional level. In similar countries such as Switzerland and Austria, there is also an incorporation of animal protection ideas into their constitutions, with the idea of animal moral responsibility being a prerequisite of the state in the safeguard of animal welfare, especially in the agricultural field and scientific research. Conversely, the status of animals has not yet been explicitly stated in the constitutions of many nations, and the management of animal welfare depends on the laws formulated by statutes. As an illustration, animals are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitutions of the United States and Pakistan, and the protection of animals depends majorly on the federal and state law including the Animal Welfare Act ("Welfare of Farmed Animals (England) Regulations 2007," 2007). The lack of constitutional guarantees of animal rights in those countries indicates that the legal position of animals in the legal framework dominated by humans remains a subject of debate. As the worldview evolves, though, the movement is toward constitutive recognition of animals as having rights to protection, which may indicate the development of increasingly robust legal frameworks beyond those that consider welfarism to the rights-based approaches.

3. Landmark Judicial Decisions and Animal Rights in The World

Following are some of the landmark judicial decisions made concerning animal rights.

3.1. Kaavan Case and Judicial Decision

The Kaavan case brought attention to the systematic animal welfare violation in the Marghazar Zoo located in Islamabad, which is subjected to excessive suffering in spite of legal protection under provisions. The Islamabad High Court who acknowledged the moral and legal shortcomings of the case ordered the relocation of Kaavan to a sanctuary, which has led to a precedent of animal rights and welfare. This landmark case highlighted the progressive nature of the judiciary in implementing animal welfare and raised debate on the legal personification of animals in Pakistan. It is also a turning point of redefining the human-animal relationship regarding legal and ethical aspects.

3.2. The Houbara Bustard case

The case of Houbara Bustard in Pakistan revealed that there was a conflict between the economic interest and conservation of environment when the Sindh High Court and the Supreme Court questioned the government to issue hunting permits to foreign dignitaries. The decisions highlighted the international nature of the commitments that Pakistan had with regard to CITES and the vulnerability of the species, and that the protection of biodiversity is more important than short-term economic benefits. In its 2015 ruling, the Supreme Court extended the right to life of Article 9 of the Constitution to encompass environmental welfare (International Union for Conservation of, 2014), which puts animal welfare into the wider ecological and moral contexts. The case is a historic precedent in the emphasis of conservation and sustainable practices in legal and policy making.

3.3. The Sandra case (2014)

The Sandra case (2014) in Argentina was a milestone in the history of animal rights because Sandra, an orangutan, gained legal personhood and was identified as a non-human person with inherent rights. This case was a landmark decision that was founded on her mental and emotional sophistication, which opposed the legal status of animals as property. The court focused on moral responsibility to sentient beings and their right to be free of unlawful confinement by extending the protections of habeas corpus. This precedent changed the world discourse on the personhood of animals, increasing more widespread discussions on the need to redefine law to recognize non-human animals as possessing rights (Asociación de Funcionarios y Abogados por los Derechos de los, 2014).

3.4. The Cecilia case (2016)

The case of Cecilia (2016) in Argentina broadened the doctrine of legal personhood by establishing Cecilia, a chimpanzee, as a non-human person, with the right to freedom and protection against the inhuman restraint. The court relied on the Sandra case to stress the mental and emotional abilities of Cecilia, claiming that she had a right to a decent treatment. The historic decision resulted in her relocation to a sanctuary where the legal and moral change away from the treatment of animals as property into viewing them as naturally deserving of dignity occurred. The case further boosted the international movement towards the redefinition of animal rights and the development of legal frameworks to protect sentient beings (Great Ape, 2016).

3.5. The Arturo case in Argentina

The Arturo case in Argentina highlighted the weaknesses of the current animal welfare laws because polar bear Arturo was kept in an unsuitable environment in the Mendoza Zoo, which caused an international uproar. Although his distress was obvious and the international petitions demanded his relocation, bureaucracy and the provision in the law made little to be done. The situation of Arturo revealed the inability of the animal welfare framework in Argentina to provide effective solutions to focus the needs of the species on the administrative stagnation. This case triggered litany of reforms focusing on active safety measures towards the captive animals and observing international standards of welfare (Peters, 2018).

3.6. The Morgan case in the Netherlands

The Morgan case in Netherlands brought to focus the ethical and legal conflicts under the captivity of marine mammals, especially orcas. Following the rescue of Morgan, the court gave

the go-ahead on her relocation to Loro Parque in Spain citing the need to conserve her despite the fear of her suffering in captivity. However, this ruling also brought up some fundamental issues concerning conservation as a basis to continue housing animals in captivity, which showed deficiencies in animal welfare laws. It highlighted that there are more effective legal frameworks where animal welfare is a priority, and conservation objectives are considered instead of the protection of species at the cost of the well-being of individuals ("Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)," 1973).

3.7. The SeaWorld Orcas case: Tilikum v. SeaWorld

The SeaWorld orcas case raised the ethical and legal questions of the suitability of keeping orcas in captivity as a form of entertainment. Animal rights activists claimed that the practice of captivity was like involuntary servitude as stipulated by the 13th amendment of the U.S. Constitution; however, the court held animal rights status as property. This ruling reinstated that animals are seen as property in the law which points at the deficiency in the current legislation in consideration of complex needs and rights of animals. It also raised broader discussions as regards whether the law should be amended to ensure that intelligent and socially complex animals are not exploited in the entertainment industries (Peters, 2010).

3.8. The Kerala High Court case (2000)

The case of 2000 Kerala High Court was a turning point in legal thinking in India as it acknowledged the sentient nature of animals and thus treated in a humane way. The court disputed the conventional property-based legal framework and confirmed the necessity to treat animals with dignity and respect. This ruling was in line with the increasing international concern on the rights of animals and strengthened the moral imperative to ensure animals are not mistreated. It established the foundation of increasing legal protections to animals, which is driving India towards the realization of the intrinsic worth of animals beyond ownership (Kerala High Court, 2000).

3.9. The ruling of the Supreme Court of India

The ruling of the Supreme Court in 2014 was a historic move that acknowledged the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution being expanded to animals, in the recognition of their sentience. The Court transformed the legal status of animals, as being a property to having rights inherent in them in order to promote the legal protection of animals against cruel treatment and exploitation. This ruling highlighted the importance of a tightening of the animal welfare laws and a more humane attitude towards the captive wildlife. It brought a revolutionary change in the Indian animal rights legislation, which brought it to be in line with the modern world attitude on animal sensitivity and legal personhood.

3.10. The Sundar case

In 2015, the Sundar case has introduced a major milestone in animal rights law in India, as the Bombay High Court applied the doctrine of public trust to obtain the removal of an elephant in inhumane environments. The court acknowledged that animals were sentient beings that needed protection by law and the state had a responsibility of protecting wildlife in the common good. This ruling revealed the flaws of the current legislations and the necessity to implement powerful changes in animal welfare. The judgment led to the public awareness and strengthening the ethical and legal imperative to protect animals from cruelty.

3.11. The Sonu case

The 2020 Sonu case in Chhattisgarh was an important development in the law of wildlife rights as the High Court declared that a wild elephant had a natural right to live in its natural habitat. The court highlighted that it was a moral duty to ensure wild animals are not subjected to cruelty and the need to embrace their natural ways of behaviour. It gave the protections of the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, and made certain that the health assessment was carried out prior to the release of the elephant. The case established a crucial precedent in the conservation and protection of wildlife in India in the future.

4. Conclusion

Finally, legal rights and personhood of animals is a paradigm shift in both moral and legal reasoning, as anthropocentric cultures had turned animals into property and denied their ability to suffer. This radical change is partly aided by developments in the field of animal cognition and such ethical theories as utilitarianism and deontology, which highlights the increased recognition

of animal sentience as a right-giving factor. The judiciary plays a central role in redefining justice to involve non-human animals as demonstrated by landmark cases in Argentina, Pakistan, and India as well as legal reforms in Germany and Brazil. Nonetheless, such development is challenged by factors such as the claim that animals are incapable of meeting the legal obligations, the difficulty of presenting an animal in court as well as opposition by industries that use animals as a means of generating income. The moral imperative to reduce suffering and the unanimity of the society in such efforts as the Universal Declaration on Animal Welfare indicate that such reform is needed, despite the fear of a slope slip to the rights approach. The importance of the balance between animal rights and human interests is crucial, because the welfare of both species should be maintained within an ethical framework of inclusion. Such cases as Kaavan and Sandra show that legal systems have the potential to go beyond anthropocentric perspectives and promote the idea of justice based on the worth of all sentient beings. Incorporating animal rights into legal frameworks not only opposes exploitation but also follows the more comprehensive goals of environmental sustainability and interspecies coexistence, which open the door to a more fair, caring, and humane society.

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